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Herrneneutica gloriae vs. herrneneutica crucis
Sebastian Franck and Martin Luther
on the Clarity of Scripture*
By Priscilla Hayden- Roy
Martin Luther maintains throughout his work, and with special emphasis in O n
the Bondage of the WilJ that Scripture is clear. Unlike Erasmus, who warns that
we should avoid obscure parts of Scripture that, like the Cave of Corycos,
would lure us too close to terrors beyond our comprehension,' Luther argues
that Scripture has been placed in the clearest light by the coming of Christ, in
whom all of Scripture's mysteries have been revealed.2 If we were to look for a

*

The basis for this article was a paper presented at the quinquecentennial celebration
of Luther's birth sponsored by the Center for Reformation Research, St.Louis, in June,
1983. I am grateful for helpful suggestions since then from Professor Steven Ozment and
from my husband, Dr. Patrick Hayden-Roy. -Abbreviations: L W : Luther's Works, 55
vols. (St. Louis, Philadelphia: 1955- 1975).- ME: Sebastian Franck: Das Theiir und

Kiinstlich Baichlin Morie Encomion das ist Ein Lob der Thorhait / von Erasmo Roterodamo
schimpfflich gespilt / zG lesen nit weniger niitzlich / dun lieblich verteiitscht (Ulm: Hans
Varnier, s. a. [ I 5341). - Paradoxa: Sebastian Franck: Paradoxa ducenta octoginta / das ist
C C L X X X Wunderred und gleichsam &*terschaj? / aus der H. Schnfi (Ulm: Johann Varnier, 1534).- WA: D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimar, 1883-).
1. See Erasmus: De libero arbitrio; Opera omnia, 9 (Hildesheim, 1963, repr. of the 1706
ed.): 1216.C.
2. See Luther: De servo arbitrio; W A 18: 606.24-28 ( LW 33: 25 f.). For the debate
between Erasmus and Luther on the clarity of Scripture see: Rudolf Hermann: "Von der
Klarheit der Heiligen Schrift. Untersuchungen und Erorterungen iiber Luthers Lehre von
der Schrift in "De servo arbitrio," in: Rudolf Hermann: Studien zur Theologie Luthers und
des Luthertums. Gesammelte und nachgelassene Werke, 2, ed. Horst Beintker (Gottingen,
1981): 170-255; Friedrich Beisser: Claritas scripturae bei Martin Luther (Gattingen, 1966),
esp. 75-130; Ernst Wolf: "Uber 'Klarheit der Heiligen Schrift' nach Luthers 'De servo
arbitrio,'" i'lteologische Literatuneitung 92 (1967): 721-730; Otto Kuss: "Ober die Klarheit der Schrift. Historische und hermeneutische Oberlegungen zu der Kontroverse des
Erasmus und des Luther iiber den freien oder versklavten Willen," in: Schriflauslegung:
Beitrage zur Henneneutik des Neuen Testamentes und im Neuen Testament, ed. Josef Ernst
(Paderborn, 1972), 89-149; Erling T.Teigen: "The Clarity of Scripture and Hermeneutical Principles in the Lutheran Confessions," Concordia Theological Quarterly 46 (1982):
147-166; Peter Neuner, Friedrich Schroger: "Luthers These von der Klarheit der Schrift,"
Theologie und Glaube 74 (1984): 39-58. For brief but instructive discussion, see Peter
Meinhold: Luthers Sprachphilosophie (Berlin, 1958), esp. 34 f. (see ibid., 2 1-27, for Meinhold's differentiation between Luther's and the Spiritualists' understanding of language,

contemporary of Luther's to represent the opposite pole, the obscurity or ambiguity of Scripture, it would not be Erasmus for whom Corycian caverns become
the hermeneutical starting point of Scriptural exegesis. The spelunker of the
darkened word is Sebastian Franck.' For this Spiritualist the truth of Scripture
is hidden: its meaning lies in puzzles and paradoxes decipherable only by those
few spiritually-minded members of the invisible church.
In the course of this discussion we shall examine the anthropological faculties on which Franck and Luther base human knowledge of spiritual matters
and how both thinkers define the nature and content of this knowledge. By this
means we shall arrive at the concept of the clarity of Scripture in the thought of
Franck (I) and Luther (11).

The Spiritualists of the 16th century were heirs to a tradition of mystical theology in which the anthropological seat of spiritual enlightenment was located in
the synteresis voluntatis et rationalis, or the Seelentnklein.' Sebastian Franck
stands in this tradition and carries it perhaps with the greatest rigor of his contemporaries to its logical concl~sion.~
Before we examine the hermeneutical implications of this anthropological
faculty we must situate it in Franck's thought, specifically in the framework of
Neo-Platonic mystical theology as he received it from the 14th century Dominican preacher, Johannes Tauler (1300-6 I), and the 15th century anonymous
tract, the neologia Deut~ch.~
Franck begins with an ontological concept of God. God is being, the simple
unity in which all things exist without differences, an ineffable, inscrutable,
using Franck as the representative of the latter); Karl-Heinz zur Mtihlen: Nos extra nos:
Luthers Theologie zwischen Mystik und Scholastik (Tiibingen, 1972), esp. 235-243 (this
book was especially helpful for my work on Luther).
3. For bibliographical information on Franck, see Christoph Dejung's bibliography:
"Sebastian Franck," in Bibliotheca Dissidentium, 7 (Baden-Baden, 1986): 39-1 19; this
work updates Klaus Kaczerowsky's Sebastian Franck. Bibfiographie (Wiesbaden, 1976).
See also Patrick Hayden-Roy: The Inner Word and the Outer World:A Biography of Sebastian Franck (Ph. D. diss., Stanford University, 1988).
4. See Steven E. Ozment: Mysticism and Dissent: Religious Ideology and Social Protest in
the Sixteenth Century (New Haven, 1973), esp. 1-13.
5. Ibid., 144 f .
6 . Franck quoted both sources frequently. H e also wrote a Latin paraphrase of the
Theologia Deutsch; see Alfred Hegler: Sebastian Francks lateinische Paraphrase der
Deutschen Theologie (Tiibingen, 1901).

uncreated Word superceding all particular knowledge and all limitations: "God
is all in all, the nature, the pleasure, the being of all being, virtue of all virtue, in
whom all things are contained. All things live and move in him, by his hand he
imparts being to [weset] all things and rules over them."' This uncreated being
emanates divine essence into the world by speaking the divine word. By this
word the invisible, transcendent spirit enters into and sustains the finite, material world:
"Now the tool, instrument and means whereby God created all things is this
almighty word alone, which was with God in the beginning and was God himself ... Therefore there is only one word of God in which all things subsist and
are supported, sustained and nourished, [even] as they are created. Alone this is
necessary-that all things must proceed from this [word]."* The relationship
between the word and the world carries over into language: the inner word, or
res signifcata, is contained in the outer word (the letter), or res signifcans. Just
as the world derives its being from the divine word, so the letter has its true signification in the spiritual, inner word.
How do these basic assumptions in Franck's thought determine how he
addresses the soteriological question? In order to gain access to God one must
turn away from the outer world, from the particulars; one must turn away from
outer sacraments, from the written word, from the dead letter, and plunge into
the realm of the invisible spirit, the uncreated word. This would be an impossible task if humankind were defined strictly as non-spirit, that is, if the results of
original sin were understood to have corrupted humankind utterly. However,
by defining God as being, and creation as the emanation of divine being, the
mere fact of one's "beingness," of entity, precludes the possibility of utter sinfulness, of nothingness. The spark of divine being, the uncreated word of God,
while obscured by the nothingness of matter and ignored by a sinful will that
tends away from the source of being, nonetheless dwells eternally, indestructibly in the highest part of the soul. Writes Franck: "God, in the wisdom of his
nature and being, laid a form, spark [zundel], trace, light, and image in the
human heart, in which God sees himself. And Scripture calls this image of God,
7 . Paradoxa, No.91 (P3v): "Gott is alles in allen / die natur / das gliick aller wesen
Wesen / aller tugent Tugent / inn jm ist alle ding beschlossen. Es regt sich / webt / und
lebt alles inn jm / in seiner handt weset und wendet er alle ding."
8. Paradoxa, No.50 Ulv): "Nun der werckzeug / instrument / und mittel dar durch
gott alle ding geschaffen hat / ist ailein disz almechtig wort / das im anfang was bei
Gott / und Gott ia selbs ... Darumb ist auch nur ain wort gottes in dern alle ding bestehen / getragen / erhalten / uii ernart werdE / wie erschaffen. Das ist allain von nbten /
ausz dern allain miisz alles gehen."

and this divine character of God's word, will, son, seed, hand, light, life, and the
truth in us. Thus we are capable of being divine [gottes vihig], and to a certain
extent we are, in accordance with this image, of divine n a t ~ r e . "With
~ the mystical notion of the inner spark (zunde4 or synteresis) Franck posits a continuum
between God and the individual. The spark is both an extension of divine
being, and an epistemological faculty for spiritual knowledge. When this faculty is activated, the individual grasps spiritual truths immediately: the need for
any mediating structures between the individual and God is obviated. Franck
even subjects his Christology to this synteresis theolofl. Christ's task was not to
atone for sin, but to remind humankind of the word within their hearts: "But
the same [God's word] is contained in all human hearts, Deut. 30 [:14], Romans
10 [:8], although few read the tables of their hearts. Therefore Christ came,
God became a person, so that he point us toward these tables and remind us of
that which was already in us, but of which we wished to know nothing."1°
Christ demonstrated to humankind the possibility of living according to this
inner nature and thus transcending the limitations of the flesh. Franck insists
that the diastasis between inner and outer word be maintained strictly even in
the deus incamatus. Christ is mbre Christ according to the inner person than
according to the outer. According to the flesh he is only a picture of God, but
according to the spirit he is the Word and God himself.11
9. Paradoxa, No. 102 (R3v): "Gott hat seiner weyszhait art und wesens ain mbter /
zundel / gespur / liecht / und bild / in des menschen hertz gelegt / darifi sich gott selbs
sihet. Und disz bild gottes / uii Gbttlichen nent die Schrifft etwan gotes wort / willen /
sun / samen / handt / liecht / leben / die wahrhait in uns. Also dz wir gottes vihig / und
etlicher masz nach disem bild / gbttlicher art sind."
10. Paradoxu, No. 118 (T4v): "Dasselbig aber ist in aller menschen hertz Deur.30.
Roma. 10. eingewickelt / ob schon gar wenig die Taffel jres hertzen lesen / und darumb
Christus kommen ist / Got ain Mensch worden / das er uns in dise Taffel weise / und eriiiert des / so vorhin in uns war / wir aber nit wissen wolten."
11. Paradoxa, No. 99 (Rlv): "Und nach disem besten tail der gotthait / ist Christus mer
Christus / dann nach dern eussern schwichsten teil des flaischs / wie ain mensch nach
dern innern menschen mer ain mensch ist / daii nach dern etisseren / da er nur ain bildlich
mensch ist / unnd allain ain figur des rechten wesentlichen menschens Also ist Christus
nach dern flaisch nur ain bild uii auszdruck Gottes / Heb. 1. Nach dern gaist aber unnd
gotthait / das Wort und gott selbs /Joan. 1."-On Franck's Christology, see Alfred Hegler: Geist und Schrif) bei Sebastian Franck: Eine Studie zur Geschichte des Spiritualismus in
der Rejonnationszeit (Freiburg i. B., 1892), esp. 185-202. Part 'of Franck's polemic against
the magisterial reformers was Christological: they clung, according to Franck, too much
to Christ's flesh, rather than to his spirit. AS Hegler notes (192 f.), this criticism attacked
specifically the doctrine of satisfaction; Franck condemned this notion of salvation extra
nos, because it encouraged moral turpitude.

This same argument carries over to the hermeneutical discussion. Just as
Christ did not become flesh, but rather was covered by it like a shawl, o r rind,
o r blanket,12 in the same way the divine Word does not really and essentially
become Scripture. Franck explicitly refutes the concept of predicatio identica de
diversis naturis in this context.') H e argues that the diastasis between flesh and
spirit makes any essential commingling between the two impossible. For this
reason the outer word, including Scripture and all the teachings of the fathers,
cannot mediate between God and the soul. At most these words "bear witness
to" the inner, invisible Word.14 T h e individual must forsake them and read the
tables of his heart inscribed directly by the spirit of God.
This deficiency of the outer word is n o stranger to orthodox medieval theology. Augustinian hermeneutics, which dominated medieval hermeneutics, distinguished between the word in its merely significative function, the res sign$cans, and the transcendent reality, the res signijicata toward which the word
pointed. Thus the sign belonged to the domain of the sensible, the flesh, while
the res signijicata was located in the intelligible o r spiritual realm.15 Ebeling has
noted that the Scholastic tradition underlines the inadequacy of linguistic communication by maintaining that: "... the true means of grace is not the word but
the sacrament. For the word keeps man at a distance from God and God at a
distance from man. The sacrament, however, unifies man with the divine itself.
Grace is infused into man in form of a created reality, as habitus of the soul; it
becomes a property (virtus) of man ... T o this corresponds, moreover, that the
word basically [is] considered as weak and dark. It is inadequate and must be

12. ME ("Encomium: Ein Lob des Thoreschten G6tlichen worts / was das sei"), t2r:
"Wie nun das flaisch / das Wort nit ist gewesen / sonder ain deck unnd grosses sacrament
des Worts. Also ist die Schrifft aigentlich nit das Wort / sonder die schal / rind / und
deck oder sacrament des worts."
13. ME ("Encomium"), t2r: "Das Wort ist gleichwol flaisch worden / durch die annemung / aber nit durch die vermischung. Also ist auch das Wort die Schrifft worden / nit
warlich und wesenlicher Predication (predicatione identica) sonder als in ainem sigel."
See also below, n. 45.
14. On Scripture as "witness" (Zeugnis) of the Word, see Hegler, Geist und Schrift,
esp. 223-228. As Hegler notes (225f.), in this concept of "Zeugnis" lies "ihr [Scripture's]
positiver Wert und ihre Grenze. Die Schrift sol1 uns als ein Zeugnis von dem unmittelbaren Wirken des gsttlichen Geistes in uns selbst und in Gott weisen; so wird manchmal ihr
Zeugnis dem inneren des Gewissens koordiniert. ... Das Zeugnis verrnittelt nicht selbst
die Sache ... Was Zeugnis ist, hat streng genommen keine heilsschaffende Kraft, darum
kann es auch nicht die hschste Auktoritat sein."
15. See Gerhard Ebeling: "Hermeneutik," in: Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, (3rd ed.) 3 (Ttibingen, 1959): 249.

explained."16 Thus Scholastic hermeneutics and the hermeneutics of heterodox
mysticism are to be distinguished not in terms of the former's 'highern view of
the word, but rather in terms of how each claims to have access to the inner
word hidden in the outer word. O n the one hand enlightenment requires the
special grace of church and sacraments, on the other immediate illumination
circumvents all need of institutional mediators of the word.
While direct access to the divine is a human possibility according to Franck,
he seems to have been obsessed with the observation that this potential remains
unrealized in the vast majority of people. They d o not read the tables of their
hearts, but instead define themselves and God according t o the outer word, the
letter. They mistake outer ceremonies for true spiritual worship-and here
Franck includes the whole scope of divinely instituted sacrificial rites of the
Old Testament and the ceremonial rituals of the medieval church.17 Because
these are visible and outward, they are of the flesh, and therefore are categorically opposed to true spiritual worship. Only a scattered minority of spirituallyminded persons perceives the invisible realm of God. For these the church
remains invisible, unincarnated.18 Here the consistency of Franck's thought
supercedes that of his contempokry Spiritualists, for whom the invisible Spirit
invariably spilled over into visible, "fleshlyn manifestations, be they sects, the
Miinster theocracy, o r the Peasants' War. Franck's spiritually-minded persons
discover the Word not in visible groups, not in political action, not in fixed
words of doctrine, but hidden in paradoxes and puzzles.19 They know that
16. Gerhard Ebeling: "The New Hermeneutics and the Early Luther," 77zeology Today
21 (1964): 45.
17.* Paradoxa, No. 89 (04r): "Die Welt aber so zii ma1 in argem ligt / und Gott wie er
ist nit erkennet / weisz sie von kainem andern Gotsdienst / dann von etisserlichem ceremonischem / Judischem gotsdienst / mit singen / wallen / beten / Pater noster tragen /
Kirchen gehen / fasten / Bildern / unnd allerlai Ceremonien."
18. Paradoxa, Introduction, 5v: "Weil die Kirch nit etwan ein sonderer hauff / und fingerzaige sect ist / an Element / zeit / person / und statt gebunden / sonder ain gaistlicher
onsichtbarer leib / aller glieder Christi / aus gott geborn / und in ainem siii / gaist / und
glauben / aber nit in ainer statt / oder etwa an einem ort eiisserlich versamlet / das man
sie sehen / und mit fingern mbge zaigen / sonder die wir glauben / uii nit sehen / daii mit
gleich gaistlichen augen des g e m h / und innern menschens / Ntmlich / die versamlung
und gemain aller recht gots frummen und giithertzigen / netier menschen / in aller Welt /
durch den Hailigen gaist / in dem fried gottes / mit dem band der lieb z3samen gtirt /
ausser deren kain hail / Christus / Gott / verstandt der Schrifft / H. gaist / noch Euangeliii ist."
19. Thus Franck explains the title of his Paradoxa (Introduction, lv-2r): "Nu hab ich
disz mein Philosophei Paradoxa intituliert / und Paradoxum ain Wunderred / oder Wunderwort / vertetitscht / weil die Theologei / der recht siii der Schrifft (so allain gottes

every word can be understood either according to the spririt or the flesh. Each
res significans is equivocal, or to use Franck's more visual designation, every
word is Y-shaped: "All things are equivocal [zwaierlai], right and wrong. These
are equivocal: love, prayer, faith, detachedness, zeal -everything. Thus it does
not suffice to pray, fast, believe, know, etc., because all things are split, they are
forked like the upsilon, the letter of Pythagorus, 'Y', which Virgil interpreted as
the crossroads where the two paths of virtue and vice part."20The res significans
points to two res significatae: a spiritual res, which is the invisible, true being of
the sign, and the fleshly res, which is the visible, false meaning given to the sign
by the world. The spiritually-minded are able to discover the inner res by
"judging according to the opposite," that is, by reversing the outer, fleshly
meaning given the word by the world: "For all things are different in truth
from their appearance viewed from the outside. In all things God holds the
counterpart of the world and judges according to the opposite. Thus as the
world holds, names, believes, speaks, wills one thing, so when you grasp the
opposite, the counter-judgment, you have grasped God's Word, wisdom and
~i11."~1
SO absolutely opposed to each other are the two meanings of the word
that a simple reversal of language according to the definitions given by what
Franck would call "outer," "worldly" political and ecclesiastical authorities,
brings one to that inner meaning held in the heart.22 For the spiritually-minded
Wort ist) nichts ist daii ain ewig Paradoxii / wider allen wahn / schein / glauben / und
achtung der gantzen welt / gewisz und waar."
20. Paradoxa, NO:60 (J4r): "Es ist alle ding zwaierlai / recht uii unrecht / Es ist zwaierlai / liebe / gebet / glaub / gelassenhait / eifer / und alles / Darumb ist es nit gnfig / betten / fasten / glauben / wissen / etc / Dann ist alle ding gespalten / unnd ain gabel / wie
das ypsilon / der bichstab Pythagore / y / welchen Vergilius fiir die wegschaid / und
zwen weg auszlegt / nemlich der tiigent / und untugent."
21. Paradoxa, No. 14 (C2r): "Dann durch aus alle ding ist anders in der warhait / daii
es von aussen an z3 sehen ist nach dem schein. Gott hilt immer z3 in allen dingen mit der
welt widerpart / unnd urtailt das widerspil / Darumb wie die Welt ain ding hilt / nennet /
glaubt / redt / wil etc. so ergreiff du das widerspil / und gegen urtail / so hastu Gottes
wort / weyszhait / und willen ergrieffen."
22. One of countless examples of this equivocal language appears in Franck's discussion of the words "rich" and "poor" as they are defined according to the spirit and the
flesh. Paradoxa, No. 35 (G4r-v): "Sufia got hilt gleich eben die weisz mit den seinen / in
seiner art / wie die welt pflegt zii handlen mit den jren / in jrer art / uff baiden hrten wirt
nur den reichen / so vorhin gnJg haben / z3 getragen / geholffen / und geben /
Ve[r]stehe aber mit den reichen uii gewaltigen in got / sonst hilt es gott mit den armen /
schwachen am flaisch / und ist baides zfigleich war. Gott hilt es mit den armen und reichen / mit den gaist armen am g i t und mfit / und mit den gaistreichen in gott. Satan hilt
das widerspill / er gafft inn die hhhe nach dem Reichen am flaisch / veracht die armen

the Y-shaped puzzle of the word is solved, the sense is clear. However, he does
not perceive the literal or conventional, grammatical sense, but rather an invisible, anti-conventional word unveiled in his heart by the spirit. Moreover, this
truth can never "surface" and affix itself to language, for as soon as the truth is
identified with the letter, it becomes dogma and loses its spiritual quality. The
inner word must remain buried, hidden in dark, paradoxical statements. Conversely, all that can mark truth externally is linguistic obscurity, for language
ultimately is incapable of presenting spiritual truth. Paradoxical language, while
failing to present spiritual truth univocally, leads the spiritually-minded reader
to find the spiritual, ineffable Word in his heart. Not surprisingly, then, Franck
upholds Scripture not for its clear exposition of truth, but because it is a book'
"sealed with seven seals."23 He levels criticism at the magisterial reformers, who
maintain that the letter of Scripture is clear and equate Scripture with the word
of God. They grasp only the fleshly letter of Scripture, says Franck, and make
that Scripture into an idol by calling it divine.24
des gaists." The confusion this equivocation generates is apparent: "rich" can mean both
"rich in spirit" and "rich in the flesh.^'~herich in spirit are those poor in the flesh. Thus
Franck can hold an apparently contradictory or paradoxical statement to be true: God
treats the rich (in spirit) and the poor (in flesh) alike. The source of this equivocation lies
in the spirit-flesh diastasis inherent in the word; it is exponentiated by the same diastasis
in the exegete, as Hegler writes (Geist und Schrifi 77): "Die Schrift ist dunkel und ungeniigend, weil sie als Buchstabe den Geist nicht zum Ausdruck bringt und der Mensch als
ein aus Geist und Fleisch zusammengesetztes Wesen stets die M~glichkeithat, sie mit den
Augen des Fleisches anzusehen." For a more differentiated discussion of the role of paradox in Franck's language, see Karl Klemm: Das Paradoxon als Ausdrucksfom der spekulativen Mystik Sebastian Francks (Leipzig, 1937).
23. The image of a book sealed with seven seals is taken from Revelations 5. One of
Franck's books, a collection of contradicting quotations from the Bible, is entitled: Das
verbiitschiert mit siben Sigeln verschlossen BGch / das recht niemandt au@ihu"n / ventehen /
oder lesen kan / dann das lamb / vnd die mit dem Thaw bezaichnet / das lamb angeho'ren
(Augsburg: Heinrich Steiner, 1539). Hegler emphasizes (Geist und Schrifi 68 f.) Franck's
distance to Luther at this point and notes that Franck speaks of the "clear word of holy
Scripture" only ironically, when quoting an opinion differing from his own.
24. See Sebastian Franck: Chronica Zeitbuch unnd Geschichtbibell (Ulm: Hans Varnier,
1536; repr. Darmstadt, 1969), Oovi-r (Ixxiiii-r): "Also machen vil yetz ein Abgott ausz
der schrifft / die sy doch nit nach dem siii Christi oder geist ... sunder nach dem todten
bfichstabE verston allenthalben / wie sy mit hellen worten klingt und laut / Gott nit einma1 bitten / das er uns sein geheymnisz (das er fur war nit an weg fur die siw in offnem
bfichstaben hat gelegt / sunder vil meer mit dem verdeckt) / eer / auszleg / unnd den todten unnd thdtenden b3chstaben / geyst und leben inn uns mach / dann die schrifft / wie
gfitt sy ymmer z3r seligkeit ist / kan sy doch kein b6sz hertz indern oder lebendig
machen / sunst weren die schrifftgelerten die friimbsten gewesen." See also Alfred Heg-

Franck's spiritual sense is divorced from the letter to the point where revelation is completely private, incapable of being verified through any institution or
dogmatic standards. The illuminati of the inner word are united in an eternal,
necessarily invisible, church. The clarity of the word lies in a continuum
between the heart and divine being. It cannot affix itself to the impermanence
and limitation of linguistic convention, or of any historical phenomena. Thus
the inner, spiritual word gives Franck access to a "hermeneutica gloriae," but at
the expe,nse of clear language. The only adequate bearer of the inner word is
dark, equivocal, paradoxical language.

As Franck's hermeneutics followed directly from his anthropology, the same
holds true for Luther. Ozment has maintained that, "Luther's Reformation theology originates and develops as a highly polemical answer to the anthropology
of late medieval the0logy."~5 H e argues that Luther consistently "desubstantiates" medieval anthropological concepts, strippihg them of all "natural" soteriological capability and placing the burden of salvation exclusively upon God.
Luther defines human faculties not in terms of their inherent power, or an
ontological similitude or identity with God, but in terms of their object, which
for Luther is God's work of salvation. Thus Luther writes in his Dictata super
Psalterium: "In the Holy Scriptures understanding takes its name from the
object rather than from any capacity, the opposite of what is in philosophy. ...
In brief this is nothing else than the wisdom of the cross of Christ, which is
folly to the Gentiles and a stumbling block to the Jews, namely, to understand
that the Son of God was incarnate and crucified and put to death and raised for
our
Similarly, Luther redefines memory, which in Platonic philosophy is the seat of the knowledge of eternal norms, as reflection upon the history of the saving works of God. The aflectus, which in mystical theology is the

ler's discussion of Franck's criticism of this aspect of the magisterial reformers in Geist
und Schrif, esp. 63-88.
25. Steven E. Ozment: Homo Spiritualis: A Comparative Study of the Anthropology of
johannes Taulet; lean Gerson and Martin Luther (1509-16) (Leiden, 1969), 3.
26. See WA 3: 176.3-10. David C. Steinmetz writes on this passage as follows: "What
Luther has in view is not an abstract knowledge of Christ or assent to a series of propositions about him, but a faithful apprehension of the saving act of God in Christ as it is
directed toward the Christian and his existence in the world"; Luther and Staupitz: An
Essay in the Intellectual Origins of the Protestant Reformation (Durham, 1980), 56. See also
Ozment, Homo Spiritualis, 112- 114.

synteresis voluntatis that longs for God, becomes the hope in God's testimonies

This shift from an inwardly situated ontological point of contact to an exclusively external source of salvation renders the human faculties soteriologically
impotent. Recognition of the self as peccator, as iniustus, thus constitutes the
"highest" form of self-recognition. This leads the young Luther to redefine the
mystical notion of "ecstasy." No longer does it afford knowledge of the similitude between self and the godhead. In the Dictata, ecstasy occurs when the self
recognizes its utter sinfulness before the righteous God." Confronted with the
self coram Deo, the individual recognizes his or her complete dependence upon
God. Salvation lies extra se in the promises of God, which can be grasped only
by faith.29 Here congruence between God and the individual is found-albeit
not in greatest similitude, as in the unio mystica - but in greatest dissimilitude:
"He who is 'unlike' God is one with God."3O Conversely, to posit similitude

27. See Ozment, Homo Spiritualis (1 10 f., 114- 117) on memoria and aflectus. In both
instances Ozment argues that for Luther it is not the power of the faculty, but the object
toward which it is directed, i.e., the saving work of God extra se, which defines and
supports its functioning: "Memoria is not taken by Luther as a 'quiddative' ground of the
powers of the soul (any more than cor or conscientia), but as a comprehensive description
of the perseverantia of the whole man as he lives meditatively (intellectus) and affectively
(voluntas) in and from the opera dei, i. e. in and from a "Zeugungsgrund" which is outside
himself" (ibid., 110, n. 2). By contrast Franck maintains that Christ's role was to uncover
the inner word already within the heart. Hegler writes on this point (Geist und SchriJi,
195): "So erhalt bei Franck der alte platonische Gedanke, dai3 alles Lernen Erinnerung ist,
die Form, dai3 aller Erwerb der gottlichen Kraft Wiedererwerb der unspr~nglichinnegehabten und nur dem Bewui3tsein verloren gegangenen Kraft ist. Das Licht, dessen
Leuchten durch das grobe Fleisch verfinstert ist, hat Christus wieder heIle gemacht."
28. For discussions of Luther's gloss in the Dictata ( WA 4: 265.30-36) of Ps. 115:ll
("Ego dixi in excessu meo: omnis homo mendax"), see Heiko Obermann: "Simul gemitus
et raptus: Luther and Mysticism," in: ?he Reformation in Medieval Perspective, ed. Steven
E. Ozment (Chicago, 197I), 234; and Steinmetz, Luther and Staupitz, 137-140.
29. Mtihlen (Nos extra nos, 51 f.) discusses the mystical background of the notion of
"exstasis extra se," noting also how the concept takes on a new definition in Luther's
hands. On Luther's use of the term "raptus" Oberman writes ("Simul gemitus et raptus,"
236 f.): "Raptws is the reliance on the righteousness of Christ outside ourselves (extra nos)
and can be described as a complete transformation into Christ (in Christumpfane transformari). ... Extra nos and raptus indicate that the iustitia Christi - and not our own powers
-is the source and resource for our righteousness."
30. See Ozment, Homo Spiritualis, 180. Note that this recognition of self as peccator is
not to be confused with the monastic virtue of humilitas; it does not function in Luther's
thought as the praeparatio by which the individual would earn God's grace. Oberman
makes this point ("Simul gemitus et raptus," 238 f.) with regard to the gemitus: "Gemitus

with God, or soteriological potential in the human faculties, demonstrates
nothing but the concupiscence (curvitas in se) that has perverted both spirit and
flesh since the fall.31 Curved into self, the individual equates his or her own virtue with godliness. Luther's redefinition of anthropological vocabulary is in
fact the beginning of his battle against "enthusiasm" as he defines it broadly in
the Smakald Articles: "Thus we shall be protected from the enthusiasts that is,
from the spiritualists who boast that they possess the spirit without and before
the Word and who therefore judge, interpret, and twist the Scriptures or
spoken Word according to their pleasure."J2 It is a battle that first had to be
directed against his own theological language holding him captive within himself. Luther replaces ontologically defined intellectual substance with substance
that lies explicitly extra se in the promises of God revealed in Christ.33
This brings us to the second limitation of human knowledge. Even when
enlightened by the Holy Spirit, the intellect does not grasp the deus nudus et
absconditus in maiestate sua. Insofar as God has chosen to hide himself, he is not
and cannot be known, as Luther insists in O n the Bondage of the Will: "To the
extent, therefore, that God hides himself and wills to be unknown to us, it is no
business of ours."" The concept of the deus absconditus serves i s a boundary
for theological inquiryJ5which is to concern itself only with the deus revelatus.

-

...presupposes faith and does not refer to a stage of preparation or to a virginal sinproof
part in man, but to the life of faith itselfn; as does Ozment in his discussion of expectare
and clamare as forms of praeparatio: "In this context, praeparatio has no refined Pelagian
overtones. ... Crying, expectation and hope point both to the absence- the soteriologically
de-substantial nature of human life - and the reality- the promises of God, 'outside' man's
power" (Homo Spiritualis, 182). Steinmetz argues (Luther and Staupitz, 93) that both
Luther and Staupitz "agree that humility is not a virtue prior to justification."
31. Luther's understanding of original sin as concupiscence establishes man's sinfulness as radical, persisting even after Baptism; this is in contrast to the Scholastic notion of
original sin as privation, for which the sacraments compensate. Thus for Luther justification never resides within man as a habitus, but is external, in Christ. Intra se man remains
a sinner. See Miihlen, Nos extra nos, 116-124.
32. 73e Book of Concord ed. Theodore G.Tappert (Philadelphia, 1959), 312.
33. Gerhard Ebeling has pointed out the shift in the definition of "substancen from the
quidditative understanding of medieval theology to the qualitative concept found in
Luther's Dictata. Here substance is the ground under one's feet (substaculum, subsidentia);
rather than being within one, it is what bears one up, namely, the hope of salvation. See
his "Die Anfange von Luthers Hermeneutik," Zeitschrif) f i r 'Ilteologie und Kirche 48
(1951): 192f.
34. L W33: 139. WA 18: 685.5-6: "Quatenus igitur Deus sesi abscondit et ignorari a
nobis vult, nihil ad nos."
35. Thus Regin Prenter maintains: "Die betreffenden Aussagen iiber die Verborgen-

For this reason Luther directs an indefatigable polemic against the enthusiasts
and contemplatives who, in their mystical ascent to the deus nudus, are either
driven to despair (the only possible reaction to God's glory), or fall prey to the
deception of the devil.36
The concept of the deus absconditus serves also to guarantee the absolute
power of God. He is the will behind the God who freely chooses to bind himself to his word. The distinction between deus absconditus and deus revelatus is
roughly comparable to the distinction favored by Nominalist theology between
the potentia dei absoluta and the potentia dei ordinata. This distinction served
likewise to free God from the necessity of the established means of grace, thus
insuring that he not be construed as a debtor to humankind. Seen in light of his
absolute power, God is not bound to effect salvation; by his ordained power he
chooses to be bound to a particular, fixed means of grace. This much of the distinction is compatible with Luther's theology. However, having conceded hiddenness and inaccessibility to the deus absolutus, the God revealed by his
ordained power was so much the more accessible to Nominalist theologians.
They argued that while the individual has no condign merit which could make
God his debtor, God chooses by'means of his ordained powers to accept the
actions of "the one who does his best" (quifacit quod in se est) as meritorio~s.~'
In his Disputation Against Scholastic Z4eology Luther clearly refutes this doctrine. Man's disposition towards God both morally and rationally consists in

heit Gottes sind nicht als Elemente einer aufzubauenden Gotteslehre zu behandeln, sondern eher als Marksteine, die allen theologischen Aussagen liber Gott eine Grenze ziehen, zu respektieren. Respektiert der Theologe die in jenen Aussagen markierte Grenze
nicht, treibt er nicht langer echte Theologie, sondern pseudophilosophisch verdorbene
Theologie." ("Luther als Theologe," in: Luther und die neologie der Gegenwart, ed. Leif
Grane et al. [Glittingen, 19771, 115.) My remarks concern the God hidden outside his
revelation, rather than within it (sub contrariis). On these two usages of "hiddenness" in
Luther's theology and the literature on this thorny subject, see Brain A. Gerrish: " T o the
Unknown God': Luther and Calvin on the Hiddenness of God," i n Brian A-Gerrish: The
Old Protestantism and the New: Essays on the Reformation Heritage (Chicago, 1982),
131-149.
36. Thus Luther writes in his Genesis Commentary (WA 43: 72.24-28): "Ab eo
[Christo crucifix01 cave discedas, qui enim abiecta vel neglecta humanitate, seu came
Christi, de Deo, ut monachi solebant, et nunc Suenckfeldius et alii solent, speculantur, aut
ad desperationem adiguntur, oppressi claritate Maiestatis, aut iubilant stulte, ac se in coe10s positos somniant, decepti a Satana, talibus praestigiis animos ludente."
37. See Heiko Oberman: "Facientibus quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam:
Robert Holcot O.P. and the Beginnings of Luther's Theology," in: n e Reformation in
Medieval Perspective, 119- 14 1.

rebellion and ignorance.'* Luther redefines the term "potentia dei ordinata" in
strictly Christocentric terms. God's ordained power lies in the "incarnate Son,"
as he writes in the Genesis Commentary: "We must reflect on God's ordered [or
ordained] power, that is, on the incarnate Son, in whom are hidden all the
treasures of the Godhead (Co1.23). Let us go to the child lying in the lap of
His mother Mary and to the sacrificial victim suspended on the cross; there we
shall really behold God, and there we shall look into His very heart. We shall
see that He is compassionate and does not desire the death of the sinner, but
It is Christ
that the sinner should 'turn from his way and live' (Ezek. 33:l
crucified and raised from the dead who is the means of salvation revealed
according to God's ordained power. Thus Luther has effectively lowered the
roof of spiritual knowledge from the deus absolutus (or deus absconditus) to the
deus revelatus. Here the mysteries of salvation are revealed. More one need not
know about God. Furthermore, even within this restricted sphere the intellect is
impotent. For by nature it is curvus in se and seeks salvation within. The intellect enlightened by the Holy Spirit sees the absolute difference between God
and self, and only at this point can the individual respond in faith to the
revealed salvation which lies extra se.
Given these restrictions, Luther's hermeneutical self-assuredness is startling.
If humankind by nature is ignorant of God, and if the intellect enlightened by
grace perceives only the revealed God, and if this limited knowledge itself is
epistemologically foreign to the human intellect, how can Luther flatly assert
that Scripture is clear? On what basis can this hermeneutical cripple make such
a statement? O r is what he asserts to be clear so restricted as to make the claim
trivial?
We recall that according to Augustinian hermeneutics, the outer word (res
significans) served to point to the inner, spiritual meaning (res significata). The
relationship of letter to meaning corresponded to that between flesh and spirit,
so that the letter, because of its externalness, was judged deficient over against
its spiritual, signified meaning in the mind of God. Spiritual understanding was
achieved only when the intellect detached itself from the transitory realm by
divine illumination and became linkened to the eternal, divine mind. Luther,
however, maintains that the final res significata behind all res significantes is not

38. Ibid., 130. For the relevant portions of the Disputatio, see W A 1 : 225-226 ( LW 3 1 :
11).
39. L W 3: 2 7 6 f . ( W A 43: 73.3-8). Significantly, this admonition follows Luther's

warning against the enthusiastic speculations of the contemplative tradition and of his
contemporary, Caspar von Schwenckfeld. (See above, n. 36.)

the mind of God, but the Word of God, deus revehtus in Jesus Christ. He places
both res signficans and res sign$cata within the potentia dei ordinata. There is
no break between visible flesh and obscured, transcendent spirit as the sign
points to its meaning. Both sign and signified are flesh, revealed. For this reason Luther can maintain that Scripture is clear.
Yet the problem remains that despite the clarity of Scripture, a soteriologically impotent intellect cannot grasp this clarity. Thus Luther distinguishes
between two kinds of clarity in O n the Bondage of the WzZZ: "There are two
kinds of clarity in Scripture ...: one external and pertaining to the ministry of
the Word, the other located in the understanding of the heart. If you speak of
the internal clarity, no man perceives one iota of what is in the Scriptures unless
he has the Spirit of God. All men have a darkened heart, so that even if they
can recite everything in Scripture, and know how to quote it, yet they apprehend and truly understand nothing of it. ... For the Spirit is required for the
understanding of Scripture, both as a whole and in any part of it. If, on the
other hand, you speak of the external clarity, nothing at all is left obscure o r
ambiguous, but everything there is in the Scriptures has been brought out by
the Word into the most definite light, and published to all the world."40 External clarity pertains to the grammatical clarity of the words (rigna, or res signifcantes) as they illumine Christ (the res, or res signijicata). Here Luther claims
that we find indisputable clarity except in those places obscured "due to our
ignorance of certain terms and grammatical particulars," and 'not to the
majesty of the subject."41 H e adds that when the res, Christ, is in the light, it
does not matter if one or the other sign (signum) is in darkness, just as a fountain in the market place is clearly visible even if it cannot be seen from a side
alley.42Philological investigation obviously takes a leading role in furthering
external clarity. Luther's freely acknowledged indebtedness to humanistic philology as well as his own translating of Scripture are prompted by his concern
for augmenting the external clarity of Scripture and making it accessible to the
common folk. But what does Luther mean by internal clarity? Only those who
have the spirit, he says, have internal clarity. Is Luther introducing with this
category an epistemological point of contact between God and the believer?
Does a henneneutica gloriae finally sneak into Luther's understanding of the
40. L W 3 3 : 28 ( W A 18: 609.4-9,ll-14).
41. L W 3 3 : 25 ( W A 18: 606.22-24).
42. W A 18: 606.35-39 (L W 3 3 : 26): "Iam nihil refert, si res sit in luce, an aliquod eius

signum sit in tenebris, cum iterim multa alia eiusdem signa sint in luce. Quis dicit fontem
publicum non esse in luce, quod hi qui in angiporto sunt, illum non vident, cum omnes qui
sunt in foro videant?"

clarity of Scriptures? Despite the similarity in diction between Luther and
Franck a t this point, their ideas diverge. Luther's internal clarity rests o n his
dual anthropology of sirnul iustus et peccator. I t proceeds n o t from the believer's
own intellect, but from t h e Holy Spirit extra se. T h e heart of man is darkened
because it is concupiscent, cwvus in se, and is ready to be enlightened only when
it recognizes its own inability t o produce a saving res significata from within.
T h e believer must see his o w n intellect condemned under the cross of Christ as
a source of ultimate signification; h e must turn extra se a n d receive in faith the
message of salvation as substance ontologically and epistemologically foreign
t o himself. T h e burden of signification falls o n God, while the believer simply
confesses, or repeat^,"^^ the res significans, the promise of salvation.
Luther's concept of the clarity of Scripture serves as a barrier f o r human
speculation: nothing beyond the deus revelatus is o f any concern to humankind.
This concept also guarantees that human intellect be defined as soteriologically
impotent: it is n o t required t o possess the spiritual meaning of the outer word,
which would be just o n e more sensus proprius, b u t to accept that res signijicata
extra re given by God. This "hermeneutics of the cross" underlies Luther's
debate with Erasmus o n free will and the debate with Zwingli and the enthusiasts o n the Eucharist; it is even a t the root of his disagreement with the papacy. In all cases Luther argues that his opponents postulate the obscurity of the
external word in order to place themselves as judge over the word, making
themselves subject and source of the res signifi~ata?~
T h e y trespass beyond the
bounds of theological hermeneutics set by the potentia dei ordinata in that they
make it their duty t o define what is behind the word. Luther's defense of the
clarity of Scripture, o n t h e other hand, will wish first t o demonstrate the external clarity of the word by showing that it is grammatically and semantically
unambiguous, and secondly will define the boundary beyond which idle specu43. Luther maintains that the believer is not to substitute his own words for God's
words: "Denn wir werden gewislich feylen, wo wir nicht einfeltiglich yhm nach sprechen,
wie er uns fur s~richt,gleich wie ein iung kind seym Vater den glauben odder Vater unser
nach spricht ..." Vom Abendmahl Christi, Bekenntnis (1528); WA 26: 439.40-440.3 (L W
37: 296). The verb nachspreclten (repeat) is used intentionally by Luther to suggest the
fraility of the human intellect in matters of faith.
44. De servo arbitrio ( WA 18: 653.2-9 [L W33: 901): "Neque illos probo, qui refugium
suum ponunt in iactantia spiritus. Nam satis acre mihi bellum isto anno fuit et adhuc est
cum istis Phanaticis, qui scripturas suo spiritui subiiciunt interpretandas, quo nomine et
Papam hactenus insectatus sum, in cuius regno hac voce nihil vulgatius aut receptius est,
Scripturas esse obscuras et ambiguas, oportere spiritum interpretem ex sede Apostolica
Romae petere, cum nihil perniciosius dicit possit, quod hinc homines impii sese supra
Scripturas extulerint et ex ipsa fecerint, quicquid collibitum fuit."

lation would begin, in order that the intellect be confronted with its soteriological impotence and then led t o receive internal clarity as

45. A brief look at Luther's defense of his interpretation of the words of institution,
"This is my body," in his Vom Abendmahl Christi, Bekenntnis (1528) illustrates how this
hermeneutics of the cross works. Luther begins with the uncompromising assertion that
the text is clear: "Denn der text mus ia einerley und einfeltig sein und einen einigen
gewissen verstand haben, sol er klar und einen gewissen artikel gnlnden." (WA 26:
262.31-3 [LW37: 1631.) That the words are univocal is an unmetaphysical assertation
whose proof lies concretely in the conventions established by the linguistic community:
"Denn wenn ich sage: Christus ist Gottes lamb, kans nicht sein, das einer durchs lamb
einen wolff, der ander ein schaff verstehe, einer mus liegen, Und ist nicht beydes vom heiligen geist." ( WA 26: 264.27-30 [L W 37: 1651.) Applying that most basic logical rule of
contradictions, Luther argues that the word "lamb" cannot be mistaken for the meaning
"wolfn-language as a given order does not allow for this confusion. In the same way
Luther argues against Oecolampadius, who sets "sign of the body" in place of "body": the
word "body" as it stands in linguistic convention does not mean "sign of the body," and
to assert their identity would be as foolish as saying Christ is Belial, or Paul is Judas ( WA
26: 279.14-20 [L W37: 1761). Later pn in the discussion Luther addresses the question of
the predicatio identica de diversis naturis, which Wycliffe maintained was an impossibility
(WA 26: 439.21-23 [ L W 37: 2951). For Luther the problem requires no metaphysical
speculation, but only the common sense of a grammarian: *Solche weise zu reden von
unterschiedlichen wesen als von einerley, heissen die grammatici Synechdochen, und ist
fast gemein nicht allein ynn der schrifft, sondern auch ynn alien sprachen." (WA 26:
444.1-3 [L W37: 301 f.].) And with his affection for everyday speech Luther gives a few
examples of what the grammarians mean: "Als wenn ich einen sack odder beutel zeige
odder dar reiche, sprech ich: Das sind hundert gGlden, da gehet das zeigen und das w6rtlin 'das' auff den beutel, Aber weil der beutel und gclden etlicher masse ein wesen sind,
als ein klumpe, so triffts zu gleich auch die gclden, Der weise nach greiffe ich ein fas an
und spreche, das ist Reinisch wein, das ist Welsch wein, das ist roter wein. Item, ich
greiffe ein glas an und spreche: das ist wasser, das ist bier, das ist salbe." ( WA 26: 444.3-9
[ LW37: 3021.) In the same way the words of institution draw on this linguistic convention: "Weil denn nu solche weise zu reden beyde inn der schrifft und allen sprachen
gemein ist, so hindert uns ym abendmal die predicatio identica nichts ...und umb der sacramentlichen einickeit willen [wird] recht gered ... 'Das ist mein leib', mit dem w6rtlin
'Das' auffs brod zu deuten, Denn es ist nu nicht mehr schlecht brod ym backofen, sondern fleischsbrod odder Ieibsbrod, das ist ein brod, so mit dem leibe Christi ein sacramentlich wesen und ein ding worden ist." ( WA 26: 444.39f., 445.8-12 [ L W 37: 3031.)
The words are clear, even if the intellect cannot grasp how this sacramental unity of body
and bread actually takes place. But to try to explicate this "how" is to subject the divinely
ordained word to human reason, a process of which Luther finds Wycliffe guilty when he
denies the possibility of the predicatio identica. In dealing with God's works and words,
maintains Luther, we are to render our reason and a11 cleverness captive, we are to blind
ourselves and let ourselves be led and taught, so that we do not become judges of God's
words ( WA 26: 439.31-36 [L W37: 2961). The believer is to accept the words of institu-

In summary we find that the tension between Franck's and Luther's hermeneutics arises from their differing anthropologies. Franck posits a Seelenfinklein, which, because it is ontologically identical with divine being, is capable of
knowing the inner, spiritual res signifcata within the outer res signt$cans. The
"spiritual" o r privileged nature of this inner word proves itself in its opposition
to the outer word, i. e., to conventional language. Conventional language is the
bearer of inner truth only insofar as it is unclear, paradoxical. The spirituallyminded exegete must overcome conventional language in his hermeneutical
journey to the word hidden within the letter and, most properly, within himself.
Luther, on the other hand, allows no ontological o r epistemological continuum
between God and humankind. First, he lowers the roof of theological knowledge to the potentia dei ordinat4 thereby excluding the possibility of overcoming the word (deus revelatus in Christ and in Scripture) and reaching God himself (deus nudus). Scripture is clear because its object, Christ, has been revealed,
and because it follows the rules of conventional language. Because the external
word is a reliable, God-ordained witness of truth, Luther promotes the visible,
institutional church in its office of proclaiming the word. But Luther, like
Franck, must then explain why, if Scripture is clear, every church-goer, every
person who hears the word, is not illumined by it. T o explain this he distinguishes between the external and internal clarity of the word. This distinction
rests on an application of his dual anthropology of simul iustus et peccator and
does not introduce a spiritualistic henneneutica gloriae. Human understanding is
darkened because it seeks to define the res signifcata of Scripture within itself.
Believers grasp salvation, for them Scripture gains internal clarity, only when
they render their own intellect captive and receive that res signifcata lying extra
re. This they do by "repeatingn or confessing the words that God has already
spoken through Christ, i.e., through Scripture. The burden of signification
rests on God, and the believers deny themselves their own hermeneutical position.
In an age when political authority was still intertwined with, and dependent
on, religious authority as in sixteenth-century Europe, the implications of
Franck's hermeneutics were far more dangerous than in our own day. With the
marginalization of religion to the private sphere and the institutionalization of
religious tolerance in Western democratic constitutions, Franck's concept of the
inner word seems to be more at home in our age than his own. His linguistic
scepticism and concomitant criticism of all institutionalized authority also
tion simply as they are written and thus make God, as their source of signification,
responsible for the final explanation of how body and bread reside together.

strike the modern as anticipatory, since criticism has, since the Enlightenment,
become the preferred intellectual method of exposing ideology.
Luther's affirmation of conventional language contains, by contrast, a certain
linguistic pragmatism that has facilitated the institutionalization of his theology
in the form of a Lutheran Church. But his hermeneutical model finds little resonance in the two most dominant discourses of the modem era: that of science
and that of individualism. Both of these offer a self-contained system of signification: science verifies its language through empirical observation, while individualism verifies its language with an appeal to the subject. Luther's model resists appropriation into either of these discourses because it is by intention not
self-contained, but depends on an authority posited outside itself and outside
the bounds of human reason o r feeling.
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Der Beitrag befai3t sich mit zwei divergierenden Auffassungen der Schrift in der Reformationszeit: auf der einen Seite die spiritualistische Auffassung der Schrift als Ratsel und
Paradoxon, wie sie Sebastian Franck vertritt, auf der anderen Seite Martin Luthers
Annahme der Klarheit der Schrift. Diese hermeneutischen Gmndpositionen gdnden sich
auf zwei verschiedene theologische Anthropologien. Von der mystischen Tradition iibernimmt Franck den Begriff des Seelenfiinkleins (synteresis), auf Gmnd dessen er sowohl
ontologische als auch epistemologische Kontinuitat zwischen Gott und Mensch voraussetzt. Dieses gottliche Erkenntnisvermegen ist dazu imstande, die innere, spirituelle res
signijicata innerhaib des aui3erlichen Schriftworts (res significans) zu begreifen. Nach
Franck zeigt sich die Uberlegenheit des spirituellen Sinnes gerade durch dessen Gegensatzlichkeit zum aui3erlichen Buchstaben. Sprache, auch Bibelsprache, ist nur insofern
Trager spiritueller Wahrheit, als sie unklar, paradox ist. Luthers Auffassung der radikalen
Siindhaftigkeit des Menschen, auch nach der Rechtfertigung (simul iustus et peccator),
schliei3t die Moglichkeit spiritueller Erkenntnis im Sinne Francks aus. Analog der nominalistischen Unterscheidung zwischen der potentia dei absoluta und potentia dei ordinata
differenziert Luther zwischen dem verborgenen und geoffenbarten Gott; sowohl das
Wort (res significans) als auch dessen Bedeutung (res significata) sind nach Christi Tod
und Auferstehung offenbar. Der Exeget dringt nicht wie bei Franck durch das Wort hindurch zum verborgenen, dem Buchstaben entgegengesetzten gettlichen Wissen, sondern
faf3t allein die durch die Konventionalitat der Sprache festgelegte, offenbare Bedeutung
des Wortes. Damit erfai3t er auch die res significata, das geoffenbarte Wort Gottes.
Luthers Unter~cheidun~
zwischen ~ui3ererund innerer Klarheit bemht auch auf seiner

Anthropologie: Dem wesentlich siindhaften Menschen wird die Schrift erst dann klar,
wenn er seinen eigenen Verstand gefangen gibt und die res significata extra se durch den
Glauben annimmt. Durch das Nachsprechen von Gottes Wort bekennt der Glaubige die
Wahrheit des Wortes; er verzichtet auf eine eigene, in sich selbst gegriindete hermeneutische Position. Schliei3lich trigt allein Gott die "Signifikationslastn des Wortes.

